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Introduction 
The GfK Group conducted a survey in three Central Eastern European countries (Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia) in May 2011 in order to learn about the opinions of the adult population about 
democracy. The fieldwork was conducted in all three countries on a national representative sample 
of 1,000-1,000 people aged 18 and over as part of an omnibus research. For the interpretation and 
comparability of the results, the current data are compared to the results of the surveys conducted 
in the same countries using the same methods and questionnaire in the 1990s, and in Austria in 
2009-2010 in every possible case (source of historic data: Plasser, Fritz – Ulram, Peter – 
Waldrauch, Harald: Politischer Kulturwandel in Ost-Mitteleuropa. Opladen. 1997. Leske+Budrich, 
illetve Plasser, Fritz – Ulram, Peter – Waldrauch, Harald: Democratic Consolidation in East-Central 
Europe. Basingstoke. 1998. Macmillan). 
Support of Democracy 
The support for the democratic form of government is basically at the same level in all three 
surveyed countries (see Table 1). The results are worthy of attention for two reasons. On the one 
hand, the support for democracy is considerably lower everywhere than in Austria, which has a 
significantly longer democratic history; at the same time both the nostalgia for dictatorship and the 
indifference to the form of government are stronger in the young democracies. On the other hand, 
it is extremely surprising that although the two decades passed since the democratic 
transformation (and the beginning of opinion polls about democracy) have brought about an almost 
total generation change, a generation whose political socialisation took place during the 
dictatorship has practically died out, and a generation who grew up in the new democratic system 
has grown up, the overall attitude to democracy has remained practically unchanged compared to 
the beginning of the ‘90s. This stability, however, is not only true of the overall picture, but across 
the generations as well: the preference for dictatorship in Hungary and Poland is no less weaker in 
the younger generations than in the older ones (e.g. in Poland, 15% of the 18-to 29-year-olds 
were on the opinion that in some cases dictatorship is better than democracy compared to the 18% 
of the over 60s, while in Hungary it is just the younger age group in which this antidemocratic 
opinion is represented slightly more). However, in Slovakia, the results are what could be 
expected: the under 50s are strongly committed to democracy, at the same time the older ones 
are either indifferent or pro dictatorship. 
 HU PL SK A (09) 
Democracy is preferable to dictatorship under any circumstances 
2011 70 66 62 90 
1995 67 65 66  
1991 69 60 67  
In some cases, dictatorship may be preferable to democracy 
2011 11 17 20 4 
1995 11 15 12  
1991 9 14 10  
For people like me, it makes no difference, whether we live in a democracy or a dictatorship 
2011 14 11 14 5 
1995 17 17 22  
1991 18 23 22  
Table 1: Support for opinions about democracy (%) 
The increase in the group of citizens committed to democracy between the middle of the 1990s and 
2011 would be difficult to hypothesise considering that satisfaction with the democratic system as a 
legitimising factor of the system is rather low in the whole Central European region, and has not 
grown in the last fifteen years at all. According to the data of Table 2, people dissatisfied with the 
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functioning of democracy have a steady majority in the Central European countries in the long run, 
and no improving trends can be seen in the opinions at all. When comparing the results surveyed 
between 1991 and 2011, it can be established that none of the countries have had a change of 
more than a few percentage points, which means the population practically have the same opinion 
about the consolidated, mature political system 20 years after the political transformation as about 
the unsettled democracy of the transitional period. The dissatisfaction with democracy in Central 
Europe is even more emphasised by the fact that only a quarter of the population are dissatisfied in 
the neighbouring Austria.  
 HU PL SK A (09) 
Very satisfied or rather satisfied 
2011 25 45 35 73 
1995 20 50 27  
1991 30 27 28  
Not at all satisfied, or rather not satisfied 
2011 70 49 60 26 
1995 77 38 67  
1991 60 50 66  
Table 2: Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy (%) 
Dissatisfaction with the system causes a serious deficit in the support for and legitimation of the 
system. In the light of the above, it is not a surprise that the weight of the social strata that can 
clearly be considered anti-democracy has increased (or at least has not decreased) in all three 
countries. On the basis of answers given to two questions, the typology of Plasser, Ulram and 
Waldrauch divides the population into five groups (see Chart 1). According to the typology, for 
example, people who believe democracy is preferable to dictatorship under any circumstances and 
prefer a multi-party system can be considered committed democrats; those who cannot see a 
difference between democracy and dictatorship and prefer a multi-party system can be placed in 
the alienated type etc. 
When the occurrence of the five possible types are examined on the basis of the 20-year trends, 
the first thing to establish is that the number of committed democrats has not increased, practically 
about 60% of the population of all three surveyed countries  can be placed in there, just like in 
1991. Fluctuations with no clear trend can be seen in the other groups of the typology as well, the 
only exception is that of anti-democrats, whose proportion – as a result of lesser or grater 
fluctuations – is about a fifth of the population now (the highest in Slovakia and lowest in 
Hungary).  
 Democracy is 
preferable to 
dictatorship under any 
circumstances 
For people like me, it 
makes no difference, 
whether we live in a 
democracy or a 
dictatorship 
In some cases, 
dictatorship may be 
preferable to 
democracy 
Preference for one 
party-system 
critical democrats latent authoritarians 
anti-democrats 
Preference for 
multiparty-system 
committed democrats alienated 
Chart 1: Typology of orientation related to democracy 
As it could be seen when democratic commitment was discussed, it is not that the voters socialised 
during the dictatorship form the anti-democratic group and young people “born into” democracy 
are committed democrats with no exception (or at least their overwhelming majority). In 
accordance with what was said above, the proportion of committed democrats in the 18-to 29-
year-old age groups is only 65% just like in the whole sample, and this group has roughly the 
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same proportion of anti-democrats as the other age groups. The Polish results developed similarly 
to the Hungarian ones, and the age effect again can only be seen in Slovakia, which means that 
the younger generations are more democratic and less authoritarian oriented.  
These facts pose the issue of spontaneous and guided political socialisation in Hungary and Poland. 
If effective democratic political socialisation existed in these countries, it could not happen that the 
younger generations show the same varied picture as regards their democratic orientation as the 
older cohorts. Slovakia offers a counterexample, where there is a gap between the democratic 
values of the youngest and older age groups: while 66% of the 18-to 29-year-olds are committed 
democrats and hardly 13% of them are anti-democrats, only 40% of the over 60s are committed 
democrats, but 35% of them are anti-democrats. 
 HU PL SK 
Committed Democrats 
2011 66 59 56 
1995 57 54 61 
1991 63 53 61 
Critical Democrats 
2011 9 12 8 
1995 14 14 5 
1991 10 10 7 
Alienated 
2011 8 6 8 
1995 10 10 21 
1991 11 15 17 
Latent Authoritarians 
2011 5 5 6 
1995 7 10 1 
1991 6 15 6 
Anti-Democrats 
2011 12 18 22 
1995 11 15 12 
1991 10 15 9 
Table 3: Proportion of types by democratic orientation (%) 
The above conclusions are confirmed if the attitudes to democracy are examined using another 
typology as well (Rose, Richard – Haerpfer, Christian: Adapting to Transformation in Eastern 
Europe. Glasgow. 1993). This theory also forms the types on the basis of answers given to two 
questions; the questions are the following: “Some people think this country would be better 
governed if parliament were closed down and all parties were abolished. How likely do you think 
this is to happen in the next few years?” and “If Parliament was closed down and parties abolished, 
would you: definitely approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove or definitely disapprove?” 
Within the 2×2 typology, people who would not welcome and do not find the abolition of 
parliament and parties likely were placed in the confident democrats group. Anxious democrats are 
those who do not support the abolition of parliament and parties, but find it conceivable. The 
hopeful authoritarians group is made up by those who would welcome the abolition of parliament 
and parties and find it likely, and finally the dejected authoritarians type are those who agree with 
the abolition of parliament and parties, but do not find it likely. 
 HU PL SK 
Confident Democrats 
2011 69 50 52 
1995 65 33 59 
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1992 64 33 61 
Anxious Democrats 
2011 3 12 4 
1995 9 34 19 
1992 11 24 19 
Hopeful Authoritarians 
2011 14 22 23 
1995 16 27 15 
1992 13 35 13 
Dejected Authoritarians 
2011 15 17 21 
1995 7 5 7 
1992 12 8 6 
Table 4: Proportion of types by democratic orientation (%) 
The only common trend seen in all three countries is a fall in the proportion of anxious democrats. 
The “coming of age” of the new political system following the political transformation – it seems – 
can provide enough evidence that the quick elimination of the democratic system of institutions is 
not only difficult to imagine, but not a real threat either. It is especially noteworthy that it is just 
Hungary that has the lowest proportion of anxious democrats (3%), although during the one year 
before the survey the messages of the parliamentary opposition focused on the fact that the 
government majority were preparing to eliminate democracy.  
The proportions of the rest of the types developed differently in the different countries; however, a 
common feature is that 30-40% of the population can be considered clearly authoritarian in 2011. 
If this result is compared to the 60-70% proportion of committed democrats, then the two 
independent measuring methods both suggest that about 2/3 of the population can be considered 
democrats and a third authoritarian. Since these proportions have been virtually unchanged in the 
last 20 years, we cannot conclude that the relatively high proportion of anti-democrats would make 
democracy fragile in the Central Eastern European countries, and we cannot conclude either that 
the functioning of the system itself will automatically create its own legitimacy and thus reduce the 
authoritarian proportion within the society. 
Since the population do not consider the elimination of the democratic political system likely, the 
nostalgia felt for the earlier system can be considered a criticism of the present system, and not an 
increase in the support for a real anti-democratic alternative.  
 HU PL SK 
Mostly or only bad sides 
2011 8 24 20 
1995 4 15 12 
1991 8 17 15 
Both good and bad sides 
2011 42 52 43 
1995 76 79 81 
1991 85 76 78 
Mostly or only good sides 
2011 36 13 31 
1995 18 4 7 
1991 5 4 6 
Table 5: Opinions of the communist system (%) 
 
 
8 
 
Considering all these, it can still be considered a huge change that while in 1991 practically only a 
handful of blinded Stalinists thought that the old regime had more better features than bad ones 
(4-6% of the population), the proportion of those who only remember the “bright side” has jumped 
to a third both in Hungary and Slovakia in 20 years, and the nostalgic ones have only remained a 
minority in Poland (although showing a significant increase), which country suffered a lot due to 
the agony of the old regime. 
The functional legitimacy of the democratic system cannot only be examined in connection with the 
satisfaction with the system, but the alienation from the political system is also a proper indicator. 
On the basis of answers given to the three questions surveying alienation, the more or less uniform 
picture of the three Central European countries is somewhat differentiated: the population of 
Slovakia has alienated from the political system even more than Hungary and Poland, although the 
two latter countries are also significantly behind the benchmark Austria. 
 HU PL SK A 
People like me have no influence on what the government does 
2011 82 78 87 69 
1995 87 85 86 68 
1991 80 88 79 - 
Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like me can hardly understand what is going 
on 
2011 70 72 75 61 
1995 77 83 77 58 
1991 72 82 85  
Politicians don’t really care what people like me think 
2011 86 84 90 - 
1995 83 89 84 67 
1991 67 77 77  
Table 6: Proportion of those agreeing with the system alienation statements (%) 
In addition, it deserves attention that diverging trends can be seen in the region related to this 
issue: while all the indexes show alienation is clearly decreasing in Poland, the results have 
practically been the same in Hungary for 20 years, while the opinions of the population about the 
system are clearly worsening in Slovakia. 
Alienation is approached from another angle by the index surveying the population’s interest in 
politics. The study of these data suggests that the population’s alienation from the system has 
been continuously increasing in Slovakia, and by 2011 this alienation has reached a stage where 
hardly one in ten voters feels it is important to follow what is happening in politics. The case of 
Hungary can be interesting where despite the strong feeling of keeping the distance, the long-term 
trend of interest in politics is clearly increasing. 
 HU PL SK 
Very much or much interested 
2011 23 12 9 
1995 19 12 10 
1991 14 12 23 
Somewhat interested 
2011 34 36 42 
1995 30 42 42 
1991 40 35 52 
Hardly or not at all interested 
2011 43 52 49 
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1995 52 45 48 
1991 43 51 23 
Table 7: Interest in politics (%) 
As opposed to functional legitimacy, the value-based legitimacy of democracy is unquestionable in 
the Central European countries. When it comes to democratic values like freedom of speech, right 
of assembly or freedom of participation in elections, practically the same proportion of the 
residents of the surveyed countries stand up to these values as in Austria.  
 HU PL SK A 
Everybody should have the right to express his or her 
opinion, even if the majority holds a different opinion 
96 89 90 98 
Every citizen has the right to take to the streets for 
his or her convictions, if necessary 
89 87 85 82 
In principle every democratic party should have the 
chance to come into power 
81 69 68 86 
Table 8: Support for democratic values (%) 
Although there are only slight differences, it cannot be considered accidental that it is just Poland 
and Slovakia where the support for the freedom of speech (apart from the practically 100% 
surveyed in Hungary and Austria, these two countries only had 90%), and the acceptance of free 
competition for power (another 10-15% deficit compared to the two other countries) is not 
unanimous. It is most probably the experience with demagogic political forces that have 
strengthened in Slovakia and Poland that encourage some of the residents of these two countries 
not to accept these democratic values without reservation. This could be indicated by the fact that 
it is just the cultural elite that have more reservations (e.g. only 17% of people with elementary 
education accept limitations as regards any party having the chance to come into power, while the 
similar proportion is 27% among college and university graduates; similarly, 7% of people with an 
elementary level of education find it acceptable to limit the freedom of speech, but 11% of college 
and university graduates in Slovakia). 
Summarising in one sentence what has been said about the support for the democratic system, we 
can say that democracy is accepted in Central Europe, however, opinions vary: when we speak 
about democratic values and principles, the system does not have considerable opposition, 
however, when thinking of the actual existing democracy, many would welcome some more 
efficient alternative. 
Opinions about the Democratic System 
As it has been pointed out above, the acceptance of the democratic system is not unanimous in the 
Central European countries. The following section examines which elements of the system 
contribute to the lack of legitimacy. 
 HU PL SK A 
Government 
2011 23 19 23 35 
1995 19 23 24 30 
1991 26 26 23 33 
Parliament 
2011 22 21 21 35 
1995 21 25 24 31 
1991 29 18 34 31 
Political parties 
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2011 12 11 14 20 
1995 10 8 15 14 
1991 16 7 20 19 
Courts of law 
2011 38 40 28 61 
1995 43 38 32 60 
1991 44 30 39 50 
Police 
2011 42 47 34 - 
1995 44 38 28 62 
1991 43 30 35 51 
Army 
2011 38 58 53 - 
1995 40 54 44 44 
1991 47 53 31 41 
Table 9: Trust in the different institutions (cumulated % of values 5 to 7 on a 7-point scale) 
Trust in the institutions of the system is generally moderate in all three countries. It should be 
emphasised that a kind of lack of trust in the institutions is typical of the new democracies, which is 
conspicuous when the results surveyed in the three Central European countries are compared to 
the Austrian figures. This comparison shows – whether it is about political institutions such as 
parliament or the government, or organisations far from politics such as courts of law or the police 
– that the confidence indexes in Austria are regularly 10-20% higher than in the other three 
countries. It is easy to discover the effect of the general Central European atomisation and lack of 
integration in this uniform distrust in all institutions, so if the democratic political institution system 
also suffers from a lack of trust, that is partly the consequence of this general trend, we cannot say 
that the acceptance of and opinions about the political institutions is a lot worse in new 
democracies than in the West, since the results are just as much worse as in the case of other 
institutions. 
Despite this restriction it is clear that the trust in political institutions has reached the lowest level 
everywhere, and practically there is no difference in the opinions about these institutions between 
Hungary, Poland or Slovakia (for example, the proportion of those who have trust in the parliament 
is 21-22% in all three countries, those in parties 11-14%). Non-political  institutions or those far 
from politics clearly received better ratings everywhere, however, there are very significant 
differences at places by country (e.g. opinions about the army are worsening in Hungary, and the 
confidence index is only at 38%, while they are improving in Poland and are at 58%).  
Finally, it is conspicuous that when the long-term trends are considered, practically all the 
institutions are losing confidence in Hungary, while the trends show a general increase in 
confidence in Poland. This may suggest that while social depression and anomy are deepening in 
Hungary, social welfare is enjoying an upward trend in Poland. 
On the basis of the study of feelings generated by politics, another sharp line can be seen on the 
two sides of the former Iron Curtain: while we can hardly find people in the three Central European 
countries in whom politics generates positive feelings (e.g. interest, enthusiasm), a third of the 
population of Austria have a positive attitude. The trends of feelings are even more conspicuous: 
while opinions about politics have been continuously worsening in the three Central European 
countries since the enthusiasm felt at the beginning of the ‘90s (e.g. the proportion of those who 
feel distrust when they think of politics has increased from 17% to 28% in Hungary in 20 years, 
and even more, from 3% to 25% that of poeple who connect disgust to politics in Slovakia), 
opinions about politics have hardly worsened in Austria. 
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 HU PL SK A 
Distrust 
2011 28 26 26 25 
1995 26 19 33 26 
1991 17 20 36 25 
Disgust 
2011 11 9 25 6 
1995 8 8 5 4 
1991 4 12 3 4 
Anger 
2011 20 15 17 21 
1995 12 10 12 20 
1991 16 11 13 14 
Indifference 
2011 19 14 14 9 
1995 21 28 19 13 
1991 25 26 12 17 
Boredom 
2011 7 20 6 3 
1995 8 12 6 3 
1991 8 7 4 4 
Positive feelings (sympathy, interest, enthusiasm) 
2011 13 14 9 33 
1995 24 23 26 30 
1991 31 22 31 37 
Table 10: Feelings generated by politics (%) 
The analysis of both the trust in institutions and the feelings generated by politics suggests that the 
political system is a formation the population of the Central European countries look upon with 
suspicion and keep a distance from, something average people are strongly alienated from. This 
means that opinions about democracy have a twofold character. While the democratic principles 
and values (free elections, freedom of speech and opinion, multi-party system etc.) are desirable 
and supported goals for the overwhelming majority of the society practically nobody opposes, the 
actual functioning of the system is not only unappreciated but also widely rejected. 
Welfare and Democratic Values 
This strong criticism of the actual functioning of the system is primarily due to the economic slump 
and the general and extensive fall in the standard of living occurring together with the democratic 
transformation. Since the stabilisation of the democratic system and the economic transformation 
that has put many at a disadvantage were taking place simultaneously after 1989, most people 
blame democracy for their own failure. As a result, no improvement in the support for democracy 
can be expected in these countries as long as the livelihood of masses of people is insecure.  
The above statement can be supported by the following facts. Partly, the differences are shocking 
between the democracy concepts of the strata with worsening and improving financial conditions. 
In Slovakia, for example, hardly a quarter of those expecting worsening conditions in their situation 
were satisfied with the functioning of the democracy, while 60% of those who expect an 
improvement, and the same trend was seen in the other two surveyed countries as well. 
The financial situation of your household in the next 10 
years will … 
HU PL SK 
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improve 40 63 60 
not change 36 52 42 
worsen 19 28 23 
Table 11: Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy by respondents economic expectation (%) 
Although the proportion of those satisfied with the functioning of the democratic system is not 
really high even within the strata in good financial condition (the index does not reach the two-
thirds level in any of the countries), if we consider that only 28% of the Hungarian, 30% of the 
Polish and 23% of the Slovakian adult population expect an improvement in their financial 
situation, that is, about a quarter of the residents of the region have an optimistic view of the 
future, then according to our forecast, no significant improvement in the acceptance of the system 
can be expected in the near future. 
By the system we do not necessarily have to mean the less supported political system, but the 
whole democratic regime. When respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement 
“security and welfare are more important than freedom,” those preferring welfare to freedom 
formed the majority in all three countries (the biggest difference was surveyed in Slovakia with a 
33:16 result, but at 36:24, the standing was incontestable in Hungary as well). 
 HU PL SK 
Fully agree or rather agree 36 38 33 
Neither agree nor disagree 37 33 41 
Rather disagree or completely disagree 24 28 16 
Table 12: Breakdown of answers given to “Security and welfare are more important than freedom” 
(%) 
It is certainly worth considering that the above results are proportions surveyed on the whole 
sample, and optimism versus pessimism about personal financial conditions also fundamentally 
influence people’s views in this respect. For example, the preferences for welfare versus freedom 
were 30:33 among the optimists in Hungary (as a reminder: about a quarter of the population), 
33:25 among those who expect stagnation in their standard of living, and welfare proved to be 
more important in the ratio of 45:21 to those who expect worsening financial conditions. The Polish 
and Slovakian trends agree with the Hungarian figures, the population of the latter would especially 
gladly trade freedom for welfare: welfare proved to be more important in the ratio of 38:21 even 
within the optimistic stratum, while the 55:11 proportion surveyed among pessimists makes all 
further analysis unnecessary. 
This devaluation of one of the most valuable achievements of the democratic system, freedom, 
cannot only be seen in connection with the welfare versus freedom dilemma, but strong 
authoritarianism and statism seem to be important characteristic features of the population of 
Central European countries.  
When it came to media regulation, Poland was the only country where people who thought that 
control was acceptable in order to ensure public order and public morals did not have a convincing 
majority, which enjoys clear support in the other two countries. The result is especially worthy of 
attention in Hungary since it was the criticism of the law limiting the freedom of the media that the 
parliamentary opposition made a cornerstone of their policy hoping that their intervention in favour 
of democracy will be met with the uniform support of the population, however, this topic is of 
serious value for only not more than a third of the population.  
 HU PL SK 
Fully or rather agree 61 45 55 
Rather or completely disagree 36 45 38 
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Table 13: Breakdown of answers given to “The state should have the right to control the media to 
make sure that public order and morale are secured” (%) 
Convincing evidence of the need for a strong government is provided by opinions about the 
economic intervention role of the government. The individual efforts versus state taking 
responsibility split the society half-and-half (Slovakia had a slight majority of the individual, 
Hungary the statist view), so does the state versus private ownership of companies (it is also 
Hungary where the most government-centred view is found, while it had a certain disadvantage in 
Poland). The explanation may certainly emerge again that the older age groups that were 
socialised before the changes in 1990 and for a long time lived in a system that did not allow 
individualistic solutions at all are more pro state, while younger generations who already grew up 
in the new system are rather individualistic, however, this logical train of thought is mostly weakly 
felt, and in some cases it is not felt at all.  
 HU PL SK 
Individuals should be responsible for their own welfare 40 46 52 
The state should be responsible for everyone's economic security 52 46 45 
 
State ownership is the best way to run an enterprise 50 35 46 
An enterprise is best run by private entrepreneurs 35 53 46 
Table 14: Support for individualist and collectivist views (%) 
For example, the members of the 18-to 29-year-old age group preferred the second option in the 
ratio of 41:59 in Hungary, while the support for the collectivist view was weaker among the over 
60s. Although the above described pattern was not true in the case of state ownership versus 
private entrepreneurs (the youngest preferred private enterprises in the ratio of 52:48, the oldest 
state ownership in the ratio of 64:36), however, it is worth mentioning that opinions were split 
half-and-half even among the 18-to 29-year-olds, which means not even this age group rejects 
state ownership in the economy on the one hand, and state ownership is clearly the preferred 
option in the next age group, among the 30-to 44-year-olds on the other hand (in the ratio of 
58:42). Although the trend that older people have more collectivist views than young people is true 
of the other two countries, however, 39% of the Polish 18-to 29-year-olds also believe that the 
state should be responsible for everyone's economic security, or 38% of the Slovakian young 
people of the same age consider the state ownership of companies better, which means the 
support for the state’s role is also very strong in these strata.  
The seriousness and strengthening nature of the need for state intervention can be confirmed by 
two other indicators. On the one hand, when it comes to the equal treatment and equal taxation of 
domestic and foreign companies, the proportion of those who feel foreign investors receive 
disproportionately more favourable treatment than the domestic ones is outstandingly high in all 
three countries, which means they think domestic enterprises suffer negative discrimination in their 
own country. Since the question was about the perception of the problem (if people see a 
difference in the treatment of the companies), and not about their opinion about the solution (what 
measures they would support to solve the problem), it is not a fact just a hypothesis when we say 
that the respondents of all three countries would expect strong state measures in order to cease 
this perceived inequality. 
 HU PL SK 
Rather equal and fair  14 24 24 
Rather unequal and unfair 71 61 65 
Table 15: Opinions about the regulation and taxation of domestic and foreign enterprises (%) 
The increasing longing for a strong-hand leader is another indicator of the need for an efficient 
state and not of the increasing acceptance of dictatorship, since the data shown in Table 1 above 
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clearly confirm that the proportion of those preferring dictatorship to democracy has not increased 
in any of the countries in the last 20 years. If we remember what was said above about the erosion 
of trust in institutions and the feelings created by politics turning more negative, then at the back 
of it is again the low efficiency of the political system: the parliament, the parties, the government 
are the institutions of empty talk, fruitless disputes that postpone action and cannot be expected to 
take the necessary measures. It is not a surprise in the light of this that efficient state intervention 
is a value the residents of the region long for so much that they feel that even strong one-person 
leadership is an acceptable price for it. 
 HU PL SK 
2011 24 42 35 
1995 20 32 17 
1993 18 39 19 
Table 16: Opinions about the statement “We do not really need a parliament. Rather we need a 
strong leader who can make decisions quickly and implement them” (%) 
Summary 
Democracy as a value and a principle governing social coexistence has not lost importance in the 
Central European countries since the democratic transformation: the biggest part of the population, 
about two thirds of it, can be considered committed democrats. However, the experience with the 
“existing democracy” in the last 20 years has been disillusioning for very many: for everyday 
people, democracy means political squabble, neglecting their needs, a state of low efficiency, the 
weakening of social cohesion and the deterioration of their standard of living. As a result, high 
tension can be felt in the countries of the region when democratic principles and the democratic 
practice are assessed: while the first one is supported without reservation, the latter creates strong 
aversion, even rejection in many. 
Since such tensions do not generally exist in the society permanently, we can see two possible 
scenarios as regards the prospects of democracy in the region. On the one hand, if dissatisfaction 
with the functioning of the democratic system remains in the long run, it will sooner or later 
question democratic principles as well: what is parliament for if it does not do anything, what are 
elections for if we can only elect worse and even worse candidates, what is freedom of speech for if 
opinions do not reach the response threshold of decision makers etc. If this scenario is realised, 
first people’s indifference to democracy will increase (“For people like me, it makes no difference, 
whether we live in a democracy or a dictatorship”), then the value of democracy may even become 
negative. 
On the other hand, the proper handling of system dysfunctions making the perception of the 
functioning of the democratic system negative may strengthen the population’s commitment to 
democracy (which still has ample room since compared to the two-thirds of the region, 90% prefer 
democracy in Austria). Meeting the population’s expectations of an efficient state can be a primary 
tool since it could be seen above that the most biting criticism of the system was about the weak, 
non-intervening state.  
